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THE JUDGMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE IN VEBIC: 
FILLING A GAP IN REGULATION 1/2003 
Nicolas Petit∗ 
Abstract: In VEBIC, the Court of Justice of the EU clarifies the prerogatives of National 
Competition Authorities under Regulation 1/2003 and paves the way towards regulatory reform 
in Belgium 
I. Legal Context and Facts 
A recent reform of European Union (“EU”) competition law may have gone unnoticed. In 
VEBIC, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“ECJ”) reworded 
Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003.1 This provision sets out the powers that Member States (“MS”) 
must bestow upon those organs which they have to designate as National Competition 
Authorities (“NCAs”) under Article 35. Following VEBIC, the new, tentative wording of Article 
5 should read as follows:  
Powers of the competition authorities of the Member States: The competition authorities of the 
Member States shall have the power to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty in individual cases. 
For this purpose, acting on their own initiative or on a complaint, they may take the following 
decisions: [...]. “The competition authorities of the Member States shall have the power to appear 
as defendants/respondents in judicial proceedings initiated before review courts against their 
decisions”. 
The case behind this silent, yet important addition to Regulation 1/2003 concerns a classic 
situation of unfortunate statutory engineering at both EU and national levels. It involved the 
interpretation of the Belgian competition statute adopted in 2006 (the “LPCE”),2 whose chief 
aim was to replace the Belgian competition agency with a more effective competition authority, 
thus solving the many deficiencies that had plagued competition enforcement in Belgium until 
then.3 To this end, the LPCE established a new competition authority, composed of (i) a 
Competition Council, in charge of the adoption of final decisions; and (ii) a Competition Service, 
in charge of the investigation of anticompetitive practices. In line with Article 5 of Regulation 
1/2003, the LPCE entrusted this authority with a range of investigative, decisional and remedial 
powers. It also regulated the judicial review of the Competition Council’s decisions by the 
Brussels Court of Appeals (the “review court”) without, however, saying anything of the 
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Competition Council’s standing as defendant/respondent before the review court. In reality, it 
even seems that the Belgian lawmakers sought to limit the role of the Competition Council in 
subsequent review proceedings. Whilst under the previous statute, the Competition Council 
would submit observations before the review court, the LPCE removed this possibility.4  
With this background, the review court was soon faced with a somewhat puzzling situation. In 
the context of annulment proceedings against an infringement decision of the Competition 
Council, the applicant, VEBIC – a professional association that had unlawfully distributed a 
price guide to its members – faced no defendant/respondent. The review court observed that no 
provision of the LPCE enabled the Competition Council to appear as defendant/respondent in 
annulment proceedings. Meanwhile, the LPCE expressly entitled the Minister for Economics to 
start annulment proceedings and appear as a party. Applying a silence means prohibition 
reasoning, it thus came to the view that the LPCE precluded the Competition Council from 
defending its decisions before the review court. This view was – and is still – shared by many 
Belgian scholars. It is corroborated by a provision of the LPCE which states that the Competition 
Council is an “administrative court”.5 Hence, as a “court”, it cannot appear as a 
defendant/respondent before another court. 
This, in turn, was a source of legal concern for the review court. Unable to defend its decisions in 
court, the Competition Council might not be able to ensure the effectiveness of the EU 
competition rules and safeguard the general economic interest. More specifically, the review 
court discerned a possible conflict between the LPCE and Article 2, 15(3) and 35(1) of 
Regulation 1/2003 which require Member States to appoint effective NCAs, vest them with 
various decisional prerogatives, and bestow upon them the ability to submit – on their own 
initiative – observations on arguments set forth in proceedings before national courts.  
The review court thus referred four questions to the ECJ under Article 267 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”).6 First, given the entitlement of NCAs to submit observations 
in national proceedings pursuant to Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003, can MS exclude – as 
arguably done by the LPCE – a NCA’s ability to appear as defendant/respondent before review 
courts? Second, do the provisions of Regulation 1/2003 go beyond a mere entitlement to submit 
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observations in national proceedings, and impose on NCAs a duty to appear as 
defendant/respondent in annulment proceedings? Third, in the affirmative, does this duty bear 
upon the NCA organ that takes the decisions mentioned at Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 (in 
contrast to the organ in charge of investigations, for instance)? Finally, does this still hold true if 
the decision-making organ qualifies as a “jurisdiction”, as jurisdictions normally do not appear 
before review courts to defend their rulings?  
Not unsurprisingly for a procedure emanating in the country of René Magritte, the case referred 
to the ECJ exhibited a range of surreal features. First, it did not involve the application of the EU 
competition rules. Absent an effect on trade between MS, the Competition Council’s decision 
was only based on national competition law. The Court nonetheless found the reference to be 
admissible. Given that the review court can remand the Competition Council’s appraisal of the 
facts, it could well decide at a later stage that the impugned conduct had an effect on trade 
between MS.7 Second, during the pleadings, the Competition Council – which appeared before 
the ECJ – took a somewhat surprising stance. In contrast to many NCAs in Europe which have 
consistently sought to expand their powers – and have been lambasted for this – the Competition 
Council argued that it should not benefit from the right to appear as respondent/defendant before 
review courts.8 To the best of our knowledge, the Belgian Competition Council may be the first 
NCA ever to support a limitation of its prerogatives. 
II. Analysis 
1. The Judgment’s Content: Effectiveness 1 – Procedural Autonomy 0 
The Court’s judgment does not beat around the bush. Given the close nexus between the four 
questions, it deals with them altogether.9 To begin with, Article 2 and Article 15(3) of 
Regulation 1/2003 enshrine no prerogative, let alone obligation, on the part of NCAs, to appear 
as parties in review proceedings against their decisions. Those provisions concern other issues, 
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respectively the burden of proof,10 and the intervention of NCAs as amicus curiae before 
national courts (not as defendant/respondent).11  
In contrast, the general obligation of MS to appoint effective NCAs enshrined in Article 
35(1) has wide ranging practical consequences. Article 35(1) seeks to ensure that in the 
decentralized enforcement system of Regulation 1/2003, the provisions of the Regulation “are 
effectively complied with” so that the EU competition rules are “applied effectively in the general 
interest”.12 In this context, if NCAs are not afforded rights as parties to review proceedings,13 
“there is a risk that the court before which the proceedings have been brought might be wholly 
‘captive’ to the pleas in law and arguments put forward by the undertaking(s) bringing the 
proceedings”.14 In turn, the Court surmises that review courts may often succumb to applicants’ 
arguments – and defuse the application of Article 101 and 102 TFEU – including in cases where 
those provisions should apply. The Court seems wary of systematic type II errors (or “false 
negatives”), which would arise from judgments repeatedly quashing NCAs’ decisions and 
exonerating harmful conduct. To avoid – or at least limit – this risk, NCAs should be entitled to 
appear before the review court. National laws that preclude such a possibility on the part of 
NCAs are not in line with Article 35.15  
The Court further adds that the effectiveness of EU competition law implies in practice that 
NCAs must use their right to appear before a review court to defend their decisions.16 Of course, 
they remain free to gauge whether their intervention is necessary and useful.17 But a consistent 
course of non intervention would violate the effectiveness of Article 101 and 102 TFEU.18  
The Court’s judgment illustrates the limits brought by the principle of effectiveness to the 
principle of procedural autonomy. That said, the Court concedes that under the latter principle, 
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MS are competent to decide which of the NCA organs may participate, as defendant/respondent, 
to review proceedings.19  
2. The Judgment’s Reasoning: Outcome 1 – Logic 0  
From a regulatory perspective, the VEBIC ruling entails a top down harmonization of national 
competition litigation rules on the basis of the ECJ’s own inter partes litigation model. Under the 
Court’s own rules of procedure, Article 263 TFEU proceedings involve litigation against the 
institution, body or organ which adopted the act whose annulment is sought.20 This outcome is at 
first sight satisfactory. With the NCA appearing as party, the review court can pass judgment out 
of a larger wealth of information.  
To reach this outcome, however, the Court relies on a somewhat specious reasoning. To take a 
controversial analogy, the Court considers that review courts faced only with annulment-driven 
arguments – and with no arguments against – would, as if they were marionettes, inevitably 
uphold such applications. This risk of type II errors would be further compounded by the fact 
that competition cases often involve “complex legal and economic assessments”.21  
Besides the fact that this underestimates, in law and facts, the review courts’ ability to rebuff 
baseless submissions, the Court’s reasoning is not entirely convincing. First, in practice, many 
competition cases arise out of complaints (or leniency applications). In such cases, complainants 
often appear before review courts to challenge the applicant’s arguments. Review courts are thus 
not always confronted only with one-sided arguments from the applicant.  
Second, annulment proceedings do not only involve the challenge of infringement decisions applying 
Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU. In a not insignificant number of cases, applicants challenge the rejection 
of a complaint by the NCA or a positive decision (e.g. an Article 101(3) TFEU decision that benefits to 
rivals). In such cases, the ECJ’s concern for the elimination of type II errors should lead to the opposite 
outcome. Here, if we follow the Court, the judicial review system should maximize chances of 
annulment, and accordingly bar the NCAs from intervening as defendants/respondents before review 
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courts. A system of this kind, where standing rules in annulment proceedings would vary with 
the type of act challenged is not, and should not, be the law.  
Finally, the reasoning that NCAs’ intervention will beneficially limit the probability of 
annulment is based on the wholly disputable assumption that NCAs’ decisions are genuinely 
sound and lawful.22 However, as a matter of fact, this assumption is incorrect. Like any other 
public institution composed of individuals subject to rational constraints (e.g., profit 
maximization) and irrational biases (e.g., confirmation biases) competition agencies – including 
the most expert ones – are bound to make mistakes in the course of their enforcement activities. 
The best proof of this lies in the fact that to date, dozens of competition agencies’ decisions have 
been quashed for legal and/or factual mistakes. In our opinion, this assumption is a source of 
concern because it reveals a preference of the Court for competition agencies over applicants. 
This, in turn, goes against the principle of equality of arms which should prevail in judicial 
proceedings. Moreover, the view that NCAs’ intervention is likely to limit chances of annulment 
is unfounded. To draw an analogy with United States litigation rules, following VEBIC, 
applicants can now “cross-examine” NCAs before review courts, and uncover mistakes, 
inconsistencies and other flaws which may have gone unnoticed from a mere reading of the 
decision. This, in turn, is likely to increase the probability of annulment, particularly in cases 
where the NCA’s decision is flawed (“type I errors” or “false convictions”).23  
III. Practical Significance 
The main consequences of the VEBIC judgment concern the Belgian authorities. In its Opinion, 
Advocate General Mengozzi hinted that the LPCE would have to undergo statutory changes.24 
Given, however, the current state of deadlock in Belgian politics, this is unlikely to happen in the 
short term. More fundamentally, the Belgian authorities seem reluctant to cast in stone a 
derogation to the general principle of law that “administrative courts” cannot be parties to 
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subsequent judicial proceedings.25 Finally, the Competition Council has unofficially voiced 
concerns that a regulatory duty to appear before the review court would further put a strain on its 
limited administrative resources.26  
In our opinion, the existing wording of the LPCE can perfectly accommodate the novel principle 
enshrined in the ECJ’s ruling. A careful reading suggests that the LPCE nowhere precludes 
explicitly the Competition Council to appear as defendant/respondent before the review court 
(contrary to the initial interpretation of the referring court).27  
This notwithstanding, there is a string of compelling reasons for a statutory amendment of the 
LPCE. First, the Competition Council is a “bifurcated” competition agency composed of several 
independent organs.28 Absent a specific regulatory provision defining which of them should 
appear in review proceedings,29 the several organs could avail themselves of the right to appear. 
This, in turn, generates concerns. With several NCA organs appearing as defendant/respondent, 
and throwing artillery in the same direction, proceedings might be unbalanced at the expense of 
the applicant (equality of arms issue). In addition, if the various NCA organs follow distinct 
litigation strategies, defense pleadings might be inconsistent (effectiveness issue). A more 
appropriate solution would thus be to designate the decision-making organ as the organ capable 
of appearing before the review court.30 Beyond common sense, this solution finds support in 
mainstream political sciences, and in particular in the literature on good governance. Judicial 
review discharges a key accountability function. For accountability to be optimal, however, it is 
the organ that adopted the decisions that must be subject to scrutiny, not a distinct organ.  
Second, a revision of the LPCE is necessary to ensure the consistent application of Belgian and 
EU competition rules. Under the VEBIC ruling, the duty of the Belgian NCA to appear as 
defendant/respondent before the review court only applies to EU competition law cases. In 
contrast, it is under no such duty in domestic competition law cases. In light of the above, and if 
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we follow the Court’s reasoning, domestic competition law proceedings might thus be more 
prone to type II errors than EU competition law proceedings. This should not, and cannot be the 
case. The LPCE should thus establish that in all competition cases (EU and domestic), the NCA 
is entitled to appear as defendant/respondent.  
Moreover, absent an amendment to the LPCE, nothing prevents the Belgian NCA from engaging 
in unlawful avoidance strategies. Given the Competition Council’s reluctance to act as party in 
review proceedings, one cannot exclude that the Competition Council will seek to decide EU 
cases under domestic competition rules only. To this end, the Belgian NCA may promote a 
restrictive interpretation of the “effect on trade” condition. In light of the fact that domestic 
competition cases fall short of the various monitoring mechanisms of Regulation 1/2003 (in 
particular, Article 11(3)), the Commission is unlikely to learn of such cases, and the duty to 
intervene before the review Court set out in VEBIC may remain ineffective.  
IV. Conclusion 
In VEBIC, the Court kills two birds with one stone. Its ruling subtly complements the key EU 
Regulation underpinning the enforcement of Article 101 and 102 TFEU and paves the way 
towards regulatory reforms in Belgium and possibly in other Member States which face similar 
issues. For instance, the French domestic legislation expressly rules out the possibility for the 
NCA to participate as a party to review proceedings.31 
As far as Belgium is concerned, the LPCE has given rise, since its inception, to quite a few 
interpretative difficulties (in particular on procedural issues). With its judgment in VEBIC, the 
ECJ has opened a window of opportunity for an extensive fine-tuning of the domestic 
competition framework. Of course, this process remains hostage to the current state of limbo in 
Belgian political affairs. That said, the Belgian competition organs can regulate a number of 
procedural issues through soft law instruments (best practices, notices, memorandums of 
understanding, etc.). Why wait? 
* 
* * 
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